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NOTES
RECENT REFORMS IN THE LAW OF ESTATES, WILLS AND TRUSTS
The New York State Legislature, in 1961, created the Temporary
Commission for the Modernization, Revision and Simplification of
the Law of Estates [hereinafter referred to as the Commission
on Estates] for the purpose of correcting the defects in the laws
relating to estates and their administration by "modernizing, simplify-
ing, and improving such law and practice." ' The Commission on
Estates has decided that the means most likely to result in legislative
acceptance of its proposals, as well as their easy assimilation into
the working knowledge of the practicing profession, was to consider
each general area of the law of estates separately and to submit
its proposals yearly to the legislature for enactment.2  Thus, after
a period of years, it is hoped that a complete modernization of the
law of estates will have been accomplished.
As a result, in the past few years, several amendments to the
Decedent Estate Law, Personal and Real Property Laws, and the
Surrogate's Court Act have been enacted, which reflect the recom-
mendations of the Commission on Estates. Many of these amend-
ments are of a technical and procedural nature with the purpose
of increasing the uniformity and fluidity of the mechanics of estate
practice. Some codify case law rules. Many others, however, make
substantial changes in New York law, as enunciated in prior cases
and statutes. It is the intent of this note to carefully examine the
most significant of these substantive changes enacted in 1965. Pro-
ceeding statute by statute, former New York law will be developed
in detail, defects will be pointed out, and the amendments will be
evaluated.
Classification and Enumeration of Future Estates
Article three of the New York Real Property Law deals with
the creation, classification and definition of estates in real property.
I N.Y. Sess. Laws 1961, ch. 731, § 1.
2 THIRD REPORT OF THE TEMPORARY COMMISSION ON THE MODERNIZATION,
REVISION AND SIMPLIFICATION OF THE LAW OF ESTATES, 1964 N.Y. LEG.
Doe. No. 19, at 14-15 [hereinafter cited as 3 ESTATES REPORT]. See also
SECOND REPORT OF THE TEMPORARY COHMISSION ON THE MODERNIZATION,
REVISION AND SIhLIFICATION OF THE LAWv OF ESTATES, 1963 N.Y. LEG.
Doc. No. 19 [hereinafter cited as 2 ESTATES REPORT]; FOURTH REPORT OF THE
TEMPORARY COMMISSION ON THE MODERNIZATION, REVISION AND SIMPLIFI-
CATION OF THE LAW OF ESTATES, 1965 N.Y. LEG. Doc. No. 19 [hereinafter
cited ai 4 ESTATES REPoRT].
For over seventy years, sections 35 to 41, in particular, have
delineated the definitions and distinctions between future estates,
i.e., those in which the right of possession is postponed to a future
time. More precisely, under a provision of the Real Property Law,"
estates have been divided into estates in possession, i.e., those
entitling the owner to immediate possession of the property, and
estates in expectancy, i.e., those postponing possession to some
future time. Estates in expectancy were limited to those enumerated
in the article, which were divided into future estates and reversions. 4
Thereafter, the statute defined future estates, remainders and re-
versions in accordance with their common-law meanings." Finally,
it was provided that a future estate must be either vested or con-
tingent-vested when an ascertained person exists who would have
an immediate right to possession of the property on the determin-
ation of all the intervening estates, and contingent "while the
person to whom or the event on which it is limited to take effect
remains uncertain." '
A source of some confusion 7 has arisen because section 40
purportedly provides for mutually inconsistent categories of future
estates. In practice these estates tend to overlap because they fit
both definitions. For example, "Blackacre to B for life, and
upon B's death remainder to C, if he is then living," is subject
to two constructions. First, C could be held to have a contingent
future interest, contingent upon his survival of B. Secondly, C
may have a vested interest, subject to divestment in the event that
he does not survive B.8  Therefore, New York courts in their
effort to effectuate the testator's (or transferor's) intent,9 working
under the basic presumption in favor of vesting," have developed
four distinct categories of future interests. The future estate
indefeasibly vested,"' the future estate vested subject to open,1 2
the future estate vested subject to complete defeasance," and the
future estate subject to condition precedent, 4 have each been
3 N.Y. REAL PROP. LAw § 35 (effective until June 1, 1966). -4 N.Y. REAL PROP. LAW § 36 (effective until June 1, 1966).
5 N.Y. RFAL PROP. LAW §37; N.Y. REAL PROP. LAW §§38, 39 (effective
until June 1, 1966).
6 N.Y. REAL PROP. LAW § 40 (effective until June 1, 1966).
7See 1962 N.Y. LEG. Doc. No. 65, N.Y. LAW REVisiON CoMm'N REp.
(C) 5.
8 See Matter of Robinson, 187 Misc. 489, 62 N.Y.S.2d 373 (Surr. Ct.
1946).
oDougherty v. Thompson, 167 N.Y. 472, 483, 60 N.E. 760, 763 (1901)
("The intention is the paramount rule of construction.").1QObid.; Connelly v. O'Brien, 166 N.Y. 406, 408, 60 N.E. 20 (1901).
11 Connelly v. O'Brien, supra note 10.
12Supra note 9; Burns v. Stilwell, 103 N.Y. 453, 9 N.E. 241 (1886).
13 Downey v. Seib, 185 N.Y. 427, 78 N.E. 66 (1906); Moore v. Littel,
41 N.Y. 66 (1869).
14 Kelso v. Lorillard, 85 N.Y. 177 (1881). Professor Simes further divides
contingent remainders into the following categories: "(a) where the remainder
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recognized in New York. These are the categories of future estates
likewise recognized by the Restatement and other eminent
authorities.' 5
The Commission on Estates followed through on prior recom-
mendations of the Law Revision Commission 1' and added further
suggestions of its own to redefine and redivide the statutory scheme
of future estates in order to clarify, unify and simplify the pertinent
sections. The legislature, adopting the Commission's proposed re-
visions, has therefore made extensive changes in the language of
the provisions in article three dealing with "future estates." One
important change is the elimination of the old term "estate in ex-
pectancy" since the traditional definition of future estates is believed
to include that concept.17  The amended section 35 (effective June
1, 1966) divides estates in property into "estates in posses-
sion" and "future estates." The definition of future estates
remains unchanged: they are estates limited to commence in
possession at some future day either with or without the de-
termination (or intervention) of a precedent estate created
at the same time. New section 36 divides future estates
into estates left in the creator, i.e., reversions, and estates
created in favor of persons other than the creator, i.e., remainders.
The amendments redefine remainders and reversions, but only to
perfect the language of existing statutory expressions of these
common-law concepts.'
In altering section 40 (effective until June 1, 1966), which
unsuccessfully divides future estates into either vested or contingent,
the legislature made sweeping changes in the language of the
section, but no change in the substance of New York law. It
merely codified prior judicial interpretations of section 40 when
it enacted new sections 40-40-c (effective June 1, 1966). The
amendments recognize four kinds of future estates :'" (1) Indefeasibly
vested estates-those created in favor of ascertained persons in
being which when created are certain to become an estate in pos-
session, e.g., "Blackacre to A for life, remainder to C and his
heirs" (C has a future estate indefeasibly vested); (2) Estates
is to an ascertained person on a condition precedent; and (b) where the
remainder is to an unborn or nonexistent persom " He adds that "some
difficulty in certain instances, however, may be experienced in determining
whether the case falls within one class or the other." 1 SIMEs & SMITH,
FUTURE INTEREST s § 111 (1956). (Emphasis added.)
15RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY § 157 (1936); 2 PoWELu, REAL PROPERTY
J J 275-78 (1950); 1 SimsS & SMITH, op. ct. supra note 14, §§ 110-14.
16Supra note 7.
1See 4 EsTATEs REPORT 436.18 Id. at 443-64.
19 These statutory definitions are modeled on those of the American Law
Institute and Professor Powell, which are cited in note 15, .supra. See also




vested subject to open-these are the same as those indefeasibly
vested except that the estate is subject to diminution by reason
of other persons becoming entitled thereto, e.g., "Blackacre to B
for life, remainder to B's children"; C is B's first child (C has a
future estate which is vested subject to open-to let in other
children of B) ; (3) Estates vested subject to complete defeasance-
those in favor of ascertained persons in being which will become
estates in possession at the expiration of preceding estates but
which are subject to termination as provided by the creator, e.g.,
"Blackacre to B for life, remainder to B's devisees and legatees,
with a power of appointment given to B, but if B fails to exercise
the power, remainder to C and his heirs" (C has a future estate
subject to complete defeasance if B exercises the power); (4)
Estates subject to a condition precedent-those in favor of unborn
or unascertained persons or dependent upon the occurrence of an
uncertain event, e.g., "Blackacre to B for life, remainder to C
and his heirs but only if C shall attain the age of 21 years"
(while he is a minor C has a future estate subject to a condition
precedent).
The amendments to article three effect no notable changes
in the law. Primarily they eliminate superfluous definitions and
classifications of future estates. In so doing, a clear and un-
ambiguous scheme of permissible future estates has been created.
Existing definitions of recognized common-law concepts have been
made more accurate. Furthermore, reform in the manner in which
estates vested was a proper subject of change and one which had
been urged upon the legislature for many years.
Validitv of "Pour-over" Provisions
"Pour-over" provisions in a will are generally utilized as a
method for devising additional property in accordance with the
terms of a pre-existing inter vivos trust. "Pour-over" bequests
and devises are usually found in the residuary clause.20
In New York, an analysis of conflicting case law leaves some
doubt as to the circumstances under which these provisions will
be held valid. Historically, the method employed by a testator
in an effort to expand a will beyond the confines of the written
instrument itself was incorporation by reference. 2' To give effect
20 2 ESTATEs REPORT 286.
21 See Samuels, Incorporation By Reference In New York Wills, 19
N.Y.U.L.Q. 270, 271-72 (1942). Basically, the common-law requirements for
incorporation were as follows: (1) a description, in the will, sufficient for
identification of an extrinsic dispositive writing, in addition to a cross
reference to the will in the extrinsic instrument; (2) proof that the writing
referred to was actually in existence at the time the will was executed;
and, (3) an intent, manifested in the will, to incorporate the existing instrument.
Id. at 272.
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to his intention, a pre-existing and extrinsic writing -was, referred
to in the will. In general, this reference was sufficient to permit
the terms of the extrinsic instrument to be incorporated into the
will itself.22  New York adopted this common-law doctrine.
2 3
In 1828, however, New York provided, by statute, that in order
for a will to be properly executed, it had to be subscribed by
the testator "at the end." 24 Initially, there was no indication
of how this statute would affect incorporation by reference, since
judicial construction of the statute bad not yet been undertaken.
The specific, question to be decided was whether the statute,
requiring subscription of a will "at the end," would be interpreted
so, as to preclude the incorporation technique.
The New York Court of Appeals, in Matter of O'Neil,2'5 decided
the subscription issue, holding that it is the physical end of the
instrument, as opposed to its logical end, to which we must look for
subscription. This decision, excluding an extrinsic, instrument,
therefore disallowed incorporation by reference. 26  Chief Justice
Ruger, by way of dictum, surmised that the "legislative intent was
doubtless to guard against frauds and uncertainty in the testamentary
disposition of property." 27 Shortly thereafter, this attitude toward
incorporation of an extrinsic instrument became firmly established
as a judicial rule of exclusion.' Thus, the New York courts
abandoned the common-law doctrine, finding it to be in opposition
to the basic principles of the statute requiring subscription at "the
end of the-will."
Although some subsequent cases validated devises or bequests
contained in extrinsic instruments,29 the rationale of the exclusionary
rule was not re-examined in light of contemporary considerations
of practicality until 1932, when the Court of Appeals decided
22 E.g., Newton v. Seaman's Friend Soc'y, 130 Mass. 91 (1881). "If a
will, executed and witnessed as required by statute, incorporates in itself
by reference any document or paper not so executed and witnessed, ...
the paper referred to therein, takes effect as part of- the will, and should
be admitted to probate as such." Id. at 93.
23 Moore v. White, 6 Johns. Ch. R. 360 (N.Y.. 1822) ; Jackson v.. Babcock,
12 Johns. R. 389 (N.Y. Sup. Ct 1815).24 N.Y. Sess. Laws 1828, ch. 6, § 40, as amended, N.Y. DxcED. EsT. LA W
§21(1).
2591 N.Y. 516 (1883).
26 Booth v. Baptist Church, 126 N.Y. 215, 247-48, 28 N.E. 238, 242
(1891). It was enunciated in this case that an unattested dispositive paper
could not be incorporated into the will, even though the paper was sufficiently
identifiable. Ibid.
27 Matter of O'Neil, 91 N.Y. 516, 520 (1883).
2& See, e.g., Matter of Hitchcock, 222 N.Y. 57, 118 N.E. 220 (1917);
Keil v. Hoehn, 72 Misc. 255, 131 N.Y. Supp. 89 (Sup. Ct. 1911); Locke
v. Rings, 66 Hun 428, 21 N.Y. Supp. 524 (Sup. Ct. 1892), re'dd on. other
grounds, 140 N.Y. 135, 35 N.E. 578 (1893).
: .Givens .v. Whitney, 233 N.Y. 665, 135 N.E. 961 (1922); Matter. of
Altman, 115Misc. 476, 188 N.Y. Supp. 493 (Surr. Ct. 1921).
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Mllatter of Rausch.30 There, the deceased stipulated that an existing
trust, which he had established for his daughter, be increased by the
residue of his estate. It was evident that the testator had attempted
to incorporate into his will the agreement creating the trust.
However, in addition to incorporation by reference, another element
was present-independent significance. Although this term has not
been precisely defined,31 it has been stated that, if the facts
identifying and explaining the gift expressed in the will have
significance outside the will, then the disposition will be valid. 2
For example, a reference to an existing trust will be permitted,
since the trust is self-sustaining and has separate meaning and
existence apart from the will. 33  Therefore, an identifying reference
to the trust is a sufficient expression of the gift itself.3 4  As a
result, it is apparent that the Court afforded decisive weight to
the concept of independent significance as a justification for in-
corporation by reference.
Subsequent cases have substantiated this decision so that it
is now indisputable that a "pour-over" provision from a will to
an existing trust agreement, merely identified by the will, must
be given effect. 35  Nevertheless, while this rule itself has been
recognized, confusion exists as to the impact of certain variants
upon the inter vivos trust. These problems may be stated as
follows :36
(a) should a "pour-over" be permitted only where the inter
vivos trust is unamendable; or,
(b) if amendable, only if it has not been amended; or,
(c) if amended, only if the amendments are immaterial; or,
(d) if amended, only where the amendments were made with
testamentary formality?
Section 47-g of the Decedent Estate Law was proposed by
the Commission on Estates in order "to resolve doubts as to the
extent to which it is permissible in New York, to devise, bequeath
or appoint property . . . to the trustee of an inter vivos trust . ,
30258 N.Y. 327, 179 N.E. 755 (1932).
31 See Matter of Fowles, 222 N.Y. 222, 233, 118 N.E. 611, 613 (1918);
see also 2 EsTATEs REPoRT 290-98.
32 Matter of Rauscb, 258 N.Y. 327, 332, 179 N.E. 755, 757 (1932).
33 See id. at 331, 179 N.E. at 756.
34 Id. at 333, 179 N.E. at 757.3
5 E.g., Matter of Ivie, 4 N.Y.2d 178, 149 N.E.2d 725, 173 N.Y.S.2d 293
(1958).
3 See, e.g., President & Directors of Manhattan Co. v. Janowitz, 260
App. Div. 174, 21 N.Y.S.2d 232 (2d Dep't 1940); Fifth Third Union Trust
Co. v. Wilensky, 70 N.E.2d 920 (Ohio 1946), which are suggestive of these
problems. See also Scott, The Law of Trusts 1941-45, 59 HAuv. L. REV.
157, 167 (1945).
37 2 ESTATES RFPORT 285.
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It appears that the statute will be successful in accomplishing
its ordained purpose. Effective June 1, 1966, section 47 -g provides
that a "pour-over" trust will be valid when the trust is executed
and acknowledged by the parties thereto, "prior to or contempor-
aneously with the execution of the testator's will or codicil and
identified therein." Where the trust instrument is amendable or
revocable, it will nevertheless be given effect as it appears in writing
on the date of the testator's death. All amendments subsequent
to death shall be effective only if the testator so declares in his will.
Consequently, only a revocation or termination of the trust before
the testator's death will cause the devise or bequest to lapse
Even under these circumstances, the disposition will not lapse where
a specific alternative provision has been made.
The liberal treatment afforded "pour-over" trusts by the legis-
lature should have a decided effect upon their continued use.
Now, a testator desirous of providing for. someone after his death,
need only create a nominal inter vivos trust for the beneficiary
and provide for an increase through an appropriate provision in his
will. This arrangement benefits both the testator and the beneficiary.
During the testator's life, he may utilize the assets intended for
the trust and, at the time of his death, the increment in the trust
will not be subject to estate taxes, since a "pour-over" trust becomes
part of an inter vivos trust, which by definition is a non-testamentary
trust.3 8
Application of Principal to Income Beneficiary
A spendthrift trust is defined as one which provides that its
income shall not be alienated by the beneficiary by anticipation or
be taken by the beneficiary's creditors in advance of payment to
him.39 In New York, by statute, all express trusts under which
the beneficiary is to receive the rents and profits of real property
or the income of personal property are spendthrift trusts. Sections
103 of the Real Property Law and 15 of the Personal Property
Law expressly provide that the right of a beneficiary to receive
such rents, profits and income "can not be transferred by assign-
ment or otherwise." 40 Furthermore, the courts have held that
these statutes render indestructible valid testamentary trusts, so that
neither the trustee, the beneficiary nor the courts may alienate the
trust property or invade the principal of the trust unless the settlor
provides otherwise. 41
38 Id. at 292.
392 BouviER, LAW DICTIONARY 3110 (8th ed. 1914).40N.Y. REAL PROP. LAW § 103(1) (a) (supp. 1965); N.Y. PEas. PROP.
LAw § 15(1) (a) (supp. 1965).
4" Cuthbert v. Chauvet, 136 N.Y. 326, 32 N.E. 1088 (1893).
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There has been an extended and articulate controversy as to
the wisdom of New York's policy that all income trusts are spend-
thrift trusts unless the settlor expressly provides to the contrary.
This interpretation by the courts overlooks the probable intent of
the drafters of the statute,42 that the section was to be applicable
to persons who were true spendthrifts, persons who require pro-
tection from themselves.43  Argument has centered about the com-
patibility of such trusts with New York's strong policy of free
alienability,44 their effect on economic initiative, 45 and their effect
in insulating a part of the real wealth of the beneficiary from his
creditors.
46
Over a period of time, statutory amendments have considerably
relaxed the apparent intractability of case-law interpretation of what
constituted a spendthrift trust. For example, while the settlor of
an inter vivos trust is still alive, the trust can be revoked with
his consent and that of all other beneficially interested' parties.47
The interests of the beneficiary's creditors have been substantially
protected by provisions which allow them to attach the income of the
trust in excess of the needs of the beneficiary for support and
education.4 8  In addition, there are procedures which enable a
creditor to garnish a maximum of ten per cent of the income of
the trust fund, and to apply to the debt such portion as the court
may decide proper with due regard for the debtor and his family's
support requirements. 49 These amendments are primarily procedural
phenomena, and were not intended to abrogate the principle upon
which the statute relating to spendthrift trusts was predicated.
In the absence of authority from the settlor or statutory mandate,
neither the beneficiary nor the trustee can alienate the trust res.
However, "these restrictions on the alienation by a beneficiary of
income under a trust fund do not apply to gifts of specific amounts
payable out of both income and principal." 50 In addition, the mere
42 1 N.Y. Rmv. STAT. tit. 2, ch. 1, § 55 at 728 (1829), now in N.Y. REAL
PROP. LAw § 103.
43 See Walsh, Indestructible Trusts and Perpetuities in New York, 43
YALE L.J. 1211, 1234 (1934). See also Leggett v. Perkins, 2 N.Y. 297, 308-09(1849).
Sparks, Policy Considerations: Alienability of the Beneficial Interest in
a Trust in New York, 9 BuFFALo L. REv. 26, 29-30 (1959) ; See also Niles,
Two Lives Down-and Goal to Go, 98 TRUSTS & ESTATES 104, 108 (1959).
4 See Walsh, supra note 43, at 1229-30. But see GRISWOLD, SPENDTHPRIT
TRUSTS § 555 (2d ed. 1947).
46 Ibid.
47 N.Y. REAL PRop. LAW § 118; N.Y. PErs. PROP. LAw § 23 (supp. 1965).
However, once the settlor dies, inter vivos trusts become virtually impossible
to revoke. See Culver v. Title Guarantee & Trust Co., 296 N.Y. 74, 70
N.E.2d 163 (1946).
4
8 N.Y. REAL PROP. LAW § 98.
49 CPLR 5205(e) (1).
50 See Matter of Trumble, 199 N.Y. 454, 92 N.E. 1073 (1910).
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fact that the trustee is empowered to invade the corpus does not,
ipso facto, permit the beneficiary to alienate his interest.5'
The 1963 report of the Commission on Estates recommended
that the beneficiary's right to the income of these spendthrift trusts
be made alienable to a limited extent, and that the courts be em-
powered to invade the trusts in cases where the income beneficiary
is destitute and incapable of educating or supporting himself.
52
Pursuant to this recommendation, the legislature, in 1964, amended
the existing sections of the Real and Personal Property Laws. 3
Likewise, Section 103-a was added to the Real Property Law,
and Section 15-a was added to the Personal Property Law. Both
sections permit a court, having jurisdiction over an income trust,
to invade the principal of such trust under the proper circumstances,
unless the instrument creating the trust provides otherwise. The
court may make an allowance from the principal to any income ben-
eficiary whose support or education would not otherwise be suf-
ficiently provided for. Before the invasion is effected, however,
the court must be satisfied that the intent of the settlor would
more nearly be carried out by invading the trust.
54
The changes effected by the 1965 amendments were necessary
adjustments to eliminate the hardship that the mandatory spendthrift
trust had caused in New York. Problems often resulted when care-
less draftsmanship omitted express authorization to invade prin-
cipal when the income made payable to the beneficiary became in-
sufficient for the purposes intended by the settlor. In addition,
few draftsmen were perspicacious enough to contemplate the effect
of inflation on the value of the trust income, which left many
beneficiaries with a virtually worthless right to minimal income
and no opportunity to make use of the still valuable, but unreachable
51 See Matter of Fowler, 263 App. Div. 255, 259, 32 N.Y.S.2d 700, 104 (3d
Dep't), aff'd, 288 N.Y. 697, 43 N.E.2d 87 (1942). See also Cuthbert v. Chau-
vet, supra note 41, at 331, 32 N.E. at 1090.
52 2 ESTATES REPORT 31.
53N.Y. REAL PROP. LAW § 103(1)(b) (supp. 1965); N.Y. PERs. PROP.
LAW § 15(1) (b) (supp. 1965). The sections in effect provide that the bene-
ficiary of an express trust, to receive rents and profits, may transfer any
amount in excess of ten thousand dollars of the anual income he is to receive
to certain enumerated persons. Such assignments shall be effective for the
period of one year.
"Under present law, future trust income is unassignable and is taxable to
the income beneficiary. The amendment changes the law only to the extent
that income beyond the needs of the beneficiary may be assigned within the
family so that greater after-tax income is available." 2 ESTATES IEPORT 456.
54N.Y. REAL PROP. LAW § 103-a(2) (supp. 1965). The principal is sus-
ceptible of invasion only to the extent the income beneficiary, in whose favor
the invasion is made, is entitled to the principal of the trust property; or, in
the event that the income beneficiary be not entitled to the principal of the
trust property, if all persons beneficially interested in the trust, being adult
and competent, consent in writing to the invasion, to the extent such persons
consent thereto. See N.Y. REAL PROP. LAw § 103-a(1)-(3) (supp. 1965).
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principal. These adjustments do much to render the mandatory
spendthrift trust tolerable, but they necessarily indicate the rejection
by the legislature of more substantial change.
The more important, and as yet unresolved, question is whether
all income trusts should necessarily be considered spendthrift. The
Commission on Estates seems to have begged the question by con-
cluding that the intent of the testator or settlor is fulfilled when
the trust he has created is interpreted as being inalienable and in-
destructible. The Commission report concludes that the settlor could
have made an outright gift if he desired to avoid the effects of a
spendthrift trust.5 5 Responsible critics have offered alternatives
which deserve more consideration than the Commission has appar-
ently given them.5
It would be feasible to develop a statutory procedure by which
spendthrift income trusts are permissible rather than mandatory.
The testator's intent to protect the trust from the beneficiary could
be given effect by allowing him to create a spendthrift trust if he
expressly provides for one. It might even be wise to restrict his
power to create spendthrift trusts to those income trusts for the
benefit of true spendthrifts. Certainly these proposals merit the
serious consideration of the legislature and the Commission.
Uniform Principal and Income Act
The adoption of the Uniform Principal and Income Act, deal-
ing with the apportionment and allocation of principal and income
in trusts, has been considered desirable by many states.57  Here, in
one concise unit, convenient and workable rules are set forth for
fiduciaries who must deal with apportionment problems peculiar
to decedents estates, with particular attention to business operations,
disposition of natural resources, sale of timber, property subject
to depletion, underproductive property and bond purchases. 58 For
purposes of this statute, principal is any property which has been set
aside by the owner, or person legally empowered, to be delivered
to a remainderman. Any return on, or use of, such principal,
whether in money or property, is income, and as such, goes to the
income beneficiary."
Recognizing both the need for uniformity in the area, and the
practical convenience of codification of the law, the Uniform Prin-
cipal and Income Act was adopted, with slight modifications, on
55 2 EsTATzs REPORT 509.
r6 See Walsh, supra note 43, at 1237-39; Sparks, supra note 44, at 31-32.
57 At least twenty-four states have thus far enacted statutes similar to the
Uniform Principal and Income Act. 3 EsTATs REPORT 422 n.8.
58 N.Y. PEas. PRoP. LAW art. 2-A (supp. 1965).
59 N.Y. Pims. PROP. LAW § 27-b (supp. 1965).
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June 1, 1965, and has been enacted in Article 2-A of the New York
Personal Property Law.60
The scope and applicability of this statute is immediately de-
limited by section 27-a(1), wherein it is stated that the trust shall
be administered "in accordance with the terms of the trust instrument,
notwithstanding any contrary provisions of this article"; and, by
section 27-a(2), which declares that where the trust instrument
bestows discretionary power upon the trustee, an inference of
abuse of this power shall not arise from the fact that the trustee
makes allocations contrary to the provisions of the article.
Therefore, it is evident that the terms of the trust instrument,
including a grant of discretionary power to the trustee, will prevent
the operation of the statute in relation to the administration of a
particular trust. Within its purview, article 2-A has notably changed
pre-existing New York law in at least three areas. First, by
proportionally increasing the rights of tax-exempt organizations
when they share, with a non-exempt legatee, in the distribution of
net income earned by the administration of an estate. Secondly, by
abandoning the fiction of "implied intention of the testator," which
cast upon the fiduciary an imperative duty to sell all under-
productive property in which both a life beneficiary and a remainder-
man had an interest. That is, since underproductive property would
not yield sufficient income for the life beneficiary, it was believed
that, by converting the property to money and distributing the
proceeds between the two interests, the testator's true intention would
be effectuated. Thirdly, the statute provides a sound basis for the
apportionment of all stock distributions between principal and
income.
The first change, concerning the distribution of net income
earned by the administration of an estate, was effected to negate
the influence of prior decisional law. For example, in 1962, the
New York Court of Appeals held that net income earned during
the administration of an estate (after the initial estate tax had
been paid but prior to distribution) should be distributed among tax-
exempt organizations and non-exempt residuary legatees in accord-
ance with their interests in the estate as set forth in the will, not
in proportion to the respective values of the estate, considered after
the payment of taxes.6 1  Thus, although it was recognized that the
amount of the trust was increased by an amount equal to the non-
taxable legatee's exemption,6 2 nevertheless, all net income earned
60 See 3 ESTATES REPoRT 421-22.
61 Matter of Schubert, 10 N.Y.2d 461, 478, 180 N.E.2d 410, 419, 225 N.Y.S.
2d 13, 25 (1962).
62 N.Y. DEcE. EsT. LAw § 124(3) (ii) (sup. 1965) provides that when
apportioning federal and state estate or other death taxes, any deduction or
exemption allowed by reason of the relationship of any person to the decedent,
or by reason of the charitable purposes of the gift, shall inure to the benefit
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by the administration of the estate, including money directly at-
tributable to the tax exemption, was divided equally.
Newly enacted Section 27-d of the New York Personal Property
Law now provides that "income earned during the further admin-
istration of the estate . . . shall be distributed to the residuary
legatees in proportion to their interests in the residuary estate after
the making of such [estate or inheritance tax] payment." (Emphasis
added.) This modification relates specifically to the inherent inequity
of the distribution made in Matter of Shubert, 3 and changes the
law in this regard.
A hypothetical will illustrate this change. Assume that a
$1,000,000 estate is to be distributed evenly between two residuary
legatees, of which one has a tax exemption. The taxable estate
is $500,000,64 on which a tax of $145,700 is paid.65 At this point,
the exempt legatee is entitled to $500,000, while the other legatee
will receive $354,300. Thus, the tax exempt legatee actually
receives approximately 59% of the net estate of $854,300. This
conclusion is not in dispute.68  Assume, however, that the net estate
is not distributed, but rather is administered and produces additional
income of $100,000. Under the Shubert rule, each legatee would
then receive 50%o or $50,000. The new statute, on the other hand,
directs distribution of this income in proportion to each legatee's
interest in the net estate, i.e., cognizance shall, be taken of
each party's interest in the net estate. Thus, the exempt legatee
will receive 90% of the income or $59,000 and his co-legatee
will be entitled to $41,000. This result is justified on a
proportional basis, i.e., if an income of $834,300 returns $100,000,
a similar income investment of $500,000 would return $59,000.
Tax exemptions for charitable, religious and scientific or-
ganizations have been created on a policy basis. 7 Section 27-d
is consistent with the intent of both state and federal tax laws,
since it permits the exempt legatee to receive his proper share of
the net income earned by the administration of an estate.
The second change effected by this statute has eliminated the
fiction that, should a devise or bequest of property subsequently
become underproductive, the testator will be deemed to have intended
a sale at his death with an allocation of the proceeds between the
income beneficiary and the remainderman. For example, in the
of the person bearing the relationship or the charitable organization receiving
the gift. Thus, the initial tax burden must be borne entirely by the non-exempt
residuary legatee.
63 10 N.Y.2d 461, 180 N.E.2d 410, 225 N.Y.S.2d 13 (1962).
64 IxT. REV. CODE of 1954, §§ 2051,2055.
65 INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 2001. The figures employed herein are based
on the present tax rate.
86 See ibid.
67 Helvering v. Bliss, 293 U.S. 144, 151 (1934).
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case of Lawrence v. Littlefield, the court was faced with the
claim that the residuary estate was not producing sufficient income
to realize the testatrix's intention of providing for the plaintiff,
her niece, as a life beneficiary. In addition to naming her niece as
income beneficiary of the estate, the testatrix provided the trustees
with a power of sale over the income producing property. The
court held that the testatrix impliedly intended that plaintiff receive
a determinable minimum monthly income from the estate. In
order that this "intention" might be fulfilled, the court ordered the
trustee to sell the real estate in question as quickly and advantageously
as possible. Plaintiff was entitled to income payments from the
proceeds of the sale computed from the time of the testatrix's death.
In addition, plaintiff was to receive income payment in the future
from this same source. The defendant's remainder was thereby
altered and became the balance of the proceeds from the sale which
might remain upon the plaintiff's death. 9
In an effort to do away with both the fiction of implied in-
tention 70 and the uncertainty of the amounts allocable thereto, the
legislature enacted a provision 71 under which all property, ex-
cluding listed securities, which does not produce an average net
income of one per cent per annum of its inventory value for more
than a year, shall be sold and the proceeds allocated, according
to a schedule established by the statute, between principal and
income.
The substitution of a concrete rule in place of the former
fiction will eliminate much litigation concerning both implied in-
tention and the question of productiveness. Moreover, to statutorily
declare that an earning capacity of one per cent or less prima facie
reduces an asset to the underproductive class is certainly reasonable.7 2
In addition, the statute provides a safeguard to the remainderman.
The third significant section of article 2-A 73 concerns the ap-
portionment between principal and income of distributions of stock
made to a trustee by a corporation or an association. The need
for such a provision becomes evident upon an analysis of the
historical developments in this area.
In 1913, the Court of Appeals decided Matter of Osborne."4
There, the court required that cognizance be taken of the following
considerations in allocating stock distributions between principal and
income: whether or not it is any part of a stock split or stock
dividend; whether profits that are capitalized are properly repre-
"215 N.Y. 561, 109 N.E. 611 (1915).69 Id, at 582-83, 109 N.E. at 618.
70bid.; see 3 EsTATEs RoRT 457-60.
71N.Y. Pmzs. PROP. LAW §27-k (supp. 1965).
72 3 EsTATEs REFORT 458.
78N.Y. Pzas. PROP. LAW § 27-e (supp. 1965).
74209 N.Y. 450, 103 N.E. 723 (1913).
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sented; and, finally, the intrinsic or intact value of the stock and its
value after distribution. It was only after making these difficult
and time-consuming determinations that the trustee was permitted
to allocate the distribution.7 5
In an effort to simplify the procedure necessitated by this
Osborne rule, Section 17-a of the New York Personal Property Law
was enacted in 1926, whereby "any dividend which shall be payable
in the stock of the corporation or association declaring . . . such
dividend . . . shall be principal and not income of such trust."
The statute, however, failed to classify stock distributions other
than stock dividends, e.g., the right to subscribe to shares of other
securities issued by the distributing corporation or association."6
In the latter situation, the trustee was forced to depend upon
decisional law to guide his course of action. In such instances,
the trustee was not even permitted to rely upon the designation
corporate directors placed on the distribution77  Indeed, it has been
repeatedly stated that: "[W] hat is capital to the corporation may be
income to the trust and what is income to an ordinary share-
holder may be corpus to a trust shareholder." 7 A change in the
times often caused a corresponding change in the judicial treatment
of stock distributions. In 1958, the contrariety of views concerning
distributions of stock was presented to the New York Court of
Appeals by seven trust companies, in an application for leave to
appeal, each contending that trustees were unable to rely upon prior
decisions as guides to proper treatment of distributions of a generally
similar character .7  However, on appeal, the Court not only refused
to end the chaotic situation, but Judge Burke placed the onus of
change on the legislature.8 0
The legislature's response 8 1 abrogates the Osborne rule and
its modifications. This statute is an extensive codification of all
distributions of stock from either a corporation or an association.
All distributions can now be apportioned quickly, simply and author-
itatively. The significance of this statute does not lie in the
nomenclature it bestows on any particular distribution. On the
contrary, its inherent importance is indicated by the fact that definite
classifications now exist for each distribution.
75 See id. at 475, 103 N.E. at 730. "[I]n each case the courts should look
into the facts, circumstances and nature of the . .. dividend and the rights of
the contending pafses according to justice and equity." Ibid.
78 N.Y. PEms. PRop. LAW § 27-e(4) (supp. 1965).
77 Matter of Osborne, 209 N.Y. 450, 476, 103 N.E. 723, 730-31 (1913).
78 Matter of Payne, 7 N.Y.2d 1, 23, 163 N.E.2d 301, 312, 194 N.Y.S.2d 465,
481 (1959) (dissenting opinion). See also Robertson v. de Brulatour, 188
N.Y. 301, 80 N.E. 938 (1907); McLouth v. Hunt, 154 N.Y. 179, 48 N.E. 548
(1897).
792 EsTATs REPORT 198-99.80 Matter of Fosdick, 4 N.Y.2d 646, 655, 152 N.E.2d 228, 233, 176 N.Y.S.2d
966, 973 (1958).
81 Supra note 73.
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Election by Surviving Spouse "
At common law, dower and curtesy protected surviving spouses
against disinheritance by vesting each with life estates in the real
property of the other.82  In the twentieth century, with wealth
concentrated primarily in personal property, dower and curtesy
were easily evaded by technical transfers, and merely resulted in
hindering the alienability of property. 3 With the dual objective
of guarantying the surviving spouse a larger and fairer share of
the deceased's estate, and of assuring that real property would be
more alienable,84 the legislature, as of August 31, 1930, abolished
curtesy and dower prospectively 85 and enacted Section 18 of the
Decedent Estate Law. This section provided the surviving spouse
with a limited personal right to elect against the will and to take the
share he or she would have been entitled to in intestacy. 6 The right
of election was not absolute, and certain minimal dispositions in
favor of the survivor could insulate the estate from attack. 7
Section 18 was defective in certain respects since, in protecting
the survivor's share of the probate estate, it made no provision for
the testator's inter vivos transfers. In particular, inter vivos transfers
which are essentially testamentary, such as Totten Trusts and joint
bank accounts, were available to the testator to make this new
elective right practically ineffective.
At first, the courts appeared to emphasize the legislative intent
of insuring the surviving spouse a proper share.8  In Nemian v.
Dore,89 the New York Court of Appeals held that transfers which
were merely "illusory" were invalid as violations of statutory policy.
The test applied was one of good faith, viz., whether the testator
seriously intended to divest himself of *ownership, irrespective ot
82See 2 POLLACK & MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF THE ENGLISH LAW 414-28
(2d ed. 1911).
83 Cox, The Right of Election, 32 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 164, 165-66 (1958).
84 Powers, Illusory Transfers and Section 18, 32 ST. Jon's L. REv. 193,
194-95 (1958).
85 N.Y. REAL PROP. LAW §§ 189, 190. (Except that a widow married to a
man before Sept. 1, 1930 still had a right of dower in lands of which he was
seised prior thereto.).
86 The intestate share is determined under the provisions of Section 83 of
the Decedent Estate Law. Section 18, however, limits the elective share by
providing that in no event can it exceed one-half of the net estate. N.Y.
DECED. EST. LAW § 18(1) (a).
87 See N.Y. DEc. EsT. LAW § 18(1) (b), (d)-(f). When the intestate
share was less than $2,500, the surviving spouse could take it outright. N.Y.
DEED. EsT. LAW § 18(1) (c). However, when it was more, by establishing a
trust equivalent to the intestate share for the benefit of the survivor, the
testator could effectively limit the elective share to $2,500 cash. N.Y. DEcED.
EsT. LAW § 18(1) (b).
ss See, e.g., Bodner v. Feit, 247 App. Div. 119, 121-22, 286 N.Y. Supp. 814,
817 (1st Dep't 1936) (emphasizing husband's intent to deprive wife of her
share).$9275 N.Y. 371, 9 N.E.2d 966 (1937).
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whether this would adversely affect the interest of the spouse.90
Therefore, it was assumed that transfers of a testamentary nature,
such as the Totten Trust, were illusory per se.91 Subsequently,
however, Matter of Halpern 92 demonstrated that the validity of the
transfer under New York law, despite the retention of significant
indicia of ownership by the testator, placed Totten Trust funds
beyond the spouse's right of election. Since the surviving spouse
can be effectively disinherited by several of these legally recognized
transfers, e.g., Totten Trusts, joint bank accounts and any others
which are not considered illusory, the elective right has become
"diluted and to a large extent meaningless." 93
With the aim of affording the surviving spouse meaningful
protection, and on the recommendation of the Commission on
Estates, sections 18-a and 18-b were added to the Decedent Estate
Law.9 4 Section 18-a provides that any gift causa mortis, Totten
Trust, deposit or tenancy with survivorship in another person,
revocable trust or one capable of being invaded, which is established
after marriage and after August 31, 1966, will be included in de-
cedent's net estate for the purpose of determining the amount which
a surviving spouse may elect to take.95 Section 18-b comprehensively
outlines the extent of the right of election as it will be applied after
the effective date of the statute. It establishes the right of a
surviving spouse to an elective share 98 of one-third of the net
estate 97 (as defined by section 18-a) if decedent is survived by children
or their descendants, and one-half thereof in all other cases. The
right of election itself remains substantially unchanged. It is still
subservient to the will if provision for the wife is made by absolute
property devise and/or the creation of a trust equal in amount
to the elective share.98 However, it has updated former section 18
00 Id. at 379, 9 N.E.2d at 969.
91 MAcDoNALD, FRAUD ON THE WIDow's SHARE 207 (1960), citing Krause
v. Krause, 171 Misc. 355, 13 N.Y.S.2d 812 (Sup. Ct 1939), rev'd, 259 App.
Div. 1057, 21 N.Y.S.2d 341 (4th Dep't 1940), modified, 285 N.Y. 27, 32 N.E.2d
779 (1941).
92 303 N.Y. 33, 100 N.E.2d 120 (1951). See also Inda v. Inda, 285 N.Y. 27,
33 N.E.2d 779 (1941) (in which a joint bank account was held similarly
valid).
93 3 EsrAES REFPORT 23. See Atkinson, The Law of Succession, 26
N.Y.U.L. REV. 954, 957 (1951).
943 EsTATEs REPORT 25. Section 145-a of the New York Surrogate's
Court Act was amended to provide the surrogate with appropriate jurisdiction.9 However, payments of any kind under a pension, stock bonus, or other
such plan, insurance proceeds, and United States savings bond payments are
specifically excluded. N.Y. DEcED. EsT. LAW § 18-a(2) (supp. 1965).
96 This right of election under section 18-b is independent of N.Y. DEcED.
EsT. LAw § 83 (supp. 1965).
07 That is, the net estate after deduction of all debts, funeral and adminis-
tration expenses, and disregarding all inheritance taxes.
98 See N.Y. DEcED. EsT. LAW § 18-b(1) (d)-(j) (supp. 1965). Section 18-b
(1) (j) codifies Matterof Shupack, 1 N.Y.2d 482, 136 N.E.2d 513, 154 N.Y.S.
2d 441 (1956), which upheld the validity of these trusts.
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by increasing, from $2,500 to $10,000, the maximum amount the
survivor can take absolutely from a trust smaller in amount than
the elective share. The section additionally expands the right of
election where there is partial intestacy. 99
Sections 18-a and 18-b, permitting a surviving spouse inter alia
to participate in certain inter vivos transactions have eliminated the
loophole fostered by judicial construction of the old statute. By
specifically identifying the traditional devices of disinheritance, the
legislature has more realistically defined the property against which
the surviving spouse will be permitted to elect. At the same time,
the value of any of the "inter vivos-testamentary" provisions, as
defined in section 18-a, that have been made in favor of the sur-
viving spouse will also be included in the computation of the elective
share.100 This reform gives vigor to the statutory policy of pro-
tecting the surviving spouse from disinheritance and alleviates the
confusion as to the effect of transfers which unlawfully subvert
the spouse's right of election.
Case law established that an illusory transfer was invalid
in its entirety and that the property, or a sum equal thereto, had to
be returned to the estate101 However, under section 18-b(3), the
residue of section 18-a testamentary transfers are valid and effective
after the pro rata deduction of the elective share. Section 18-a will
include in the net estate those trusts over which the deceased had
maintained a degree of control,1 0 2 but, presumably, they must be
distinguished from a "purported trust" over which deceased retained
virtually complete control, i.e., the type condemned in Newman v.
Dore. The first is a real trust, and upon an election its beneficiary
will suffer only to the extent of its pro rata contribution to the
elective share. 10 3  The latter is not a real trust, nor even a real
transfer, and deserves different treatment. It may be surmised that
the legislature's intent with regard to these truly fraudulent transfers
was that they continue to be treated as in Newman. However,
the legislature has left open the possibility of their being diminished
merely by a proportionate contribution to the elective share, and
not declared entirely invalid, as in Newman.
The legislature's choice in proscribing certain enumerated
devices, which have been used to defeat the elective right, appears
99 N.Y. DECEm. EsT. LAW § 18-b(2) (supp. 1965).
o00 The old law sometimes gave an unintended benefit to the survivor: the
spouse could be well provided for by Totten Trusts, and at the same time
retain the right to elect against the will.
101 See Matter of Halpern, 303 N.Y. 33, 40, 100 N.E.2d 120, 123 (1951).
102 Where the settlor retains "a power to revoke such disposition, or a
power to consume, invade or dispose of the principal thereof," the disposition
will be regarded as testamentary in nature, and shall be included in the trust
estate. N.Y. DEcED. EsT. LAW § 18-a(1) (e) (supp. 1965).
102 It must be noted that subsections 18-a(1) (e) and 18-b(3) must be read
in conjunction with each other to reach this conclusion.
[ VOL. 40
NOTES
to be a wise one. It eliminates the difficulties of interpretation in-
volved in a broadly worded test, 04 and yet it minimizes an un-
desirable burdening of the freedom of alienation which a more
arbitrary standard test would involve, e.g., the federal income tax ap-
proach which includes in the estate all transfers made within three
years of death."0 5
Although the statute expressly exempts from its application in-
surance proceeds and "pay to survivor" United States savings bonds,
it is unlikely that these exemptions will be utilized as effective means
of disinheriting a surviving spouse. However, if future cases in-
dicate that these exemptions are being employed to frustrate our
declared public policy, the legislature should be prepared to amend
the statute, so that the overall policy of providing the wife with a
substantial share of her spouse's "testamentary" estate will be
effectuated. The legislature has additionally closed a loophole in
advance by extending the elective share concept to intestacies. This
provision has the commendable effect of preventing the deceased
from making inter vivos-testamentary transfers, and then dying in-
testate to prevent the surviving spouse from being able to elect.
A continuing defect in the amendments consists in the fact that,
although the surviving spouse's share is reduced from one-half to
one-third if there are issue, there is no guarantee that the children
will be provided for out of the increased unelected portion. 08 For
example, where a deceased husband leaves his estate to persons other
than those in his immediate family, the surviving spouse's elective
share will be decreased, not for the benefit of the decedent's children,
but for the benefit of non-familials, even though the wife may have
to use her decreased elective share to support several of the
children.
Evaluated as a whole the addition of sections 18-a and 18-b
have the pronounced effect of allowing a surviving spouse to elect
against an estate which more nearly reflects the true or actual
estate of the deceased spouse.
Inheritance by and from Illegitimates
At common law, a child born out of wedlock was "filius nullius,"
or son of no one, and had no inheritance rights. 0 7 In the past,
New York has chosen to alter this concept by means of statutory
enactmentL'os
204E.g., MODEL PROBATE CODE §33(a) (Simes 1946) treats "any gift in
fraud of the marital rights" as a testamentary disposition.
'OU See Garland, The Non-Barrable Share: Some Comments Regarding a
Reappraisal, 32 ST. JoHrN's L. REv. 219, 225 (1958).
206 Id. at 222.
107 1 BLAcxsTONE, COmmENTAR ES *129.
108 Section 24 of the New York Domestic Relations Law provides, in sub-
stance, that an illegitimate child whose parents intermarry, or who have in-
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Presently, intestate inheritance by an illegitimate child in New
York is governed by subdivision 13 of Section 83 of the Decedent
Estate Law. Under this statute, the illegitimate child inherits from
the mother when there is no lawful issue.'19 While the illegitimate
is thus statutorily permitted to inherit from the mother, nevertheless,
he may not inherit from the mother's relatives -0o after the death
of the mother, either as a representative of the mother or as the
intestate's next of kin. An exception to this rule is made only
when the intestate is another illegitimate child of the mother."' 1
Inheritance from the child is governed by subdivision 7 of section
83. Significantly, where the illegitimate is survived by a spouse
and a descendlant, the intestate distribution of his estate comports
with normal succession intestacy. In addition, where the illegitimate
is survived by children and predeceased by his spouse, the dis-
tribution is in accordance with the norm; but where he is survived
solely by a spouse and his mother, the spouse takes five thousand
dollars and one-half the residue, with the balance going to the
mother or her relatives, with the illegitimate's father being excluded.
However, if the illegitimate is survived only by his parents or their
relatives, his mother, or her relatives should she be dead, inherit
from the estate as if the child were legitimate and predeceased by his
father and his father's relatives.112
Finally, under no circumstances can the child take anything
in intestacy from his father or his father's kindred," 3 nor can the
father receive an intestate portion of the illegitimate's estate." 4
With reference to New York's statutory provisions, it has been
stated that "perhaps the greatest area of discrimination against an
illegitimate, and one where no amelioration has been forthcoming,
termarried, is legitimatized and is entitled to the rights and privileges of
legitimate children. Section 145 of the same statute provides that children
conceived after a marriage which was subsequently annulled are. deemed the
legitimate children of both parents in certain cases. Where the marriage was
procured by force, duress or fraud, they are deemed legitimate unless the court
declares otherwise. If the marriage is void because of an existing marriage,
the children are nevertheless legitimate if, for example, the ifulocent party
was without knowledge of the prior marriage. However, if the children are
born before a marriage which is void or voidable (except as shown above),
they will be illegitimate unless the court declares them legitimate.
309 See Battalico v. Knickbocker Fireproofing Co., 250 App. Div. 258,
294 N.Y. Supp. 481 (3d Dep't 1937) ; Matter of Anonymous, 165 Misc. 62, 300
N.Y. Supp. 292 (Surr. Ct. 1937).
110 Matter of Cady, 257 App. Div. 129, 12 N.Y.S.2d 750 (3d Dep't), aff'd,
281 N.Y. 688, 23 N.E.2d 18 (1939) ; Matter of Underhill's Estate, 176 Misc.
737, 28 N.Y.S.2d 984 (Surr. Ct. 1941).
"I1 See Matter of Karenius, 170 Misc. 652, 11 N.Y.S.2d 44 (Surr. Ct. 1939);
Matter of Lutz, 43 Misc. 230, 88 N.Y. Supp. 556 (Surr. Ct. 1904).
112 See, e.g., Anonymous v. Anonymous, 174 Misc. 906, 22 N.Y.S.2d 598
(Fam. Ct. 1940).
I's See, e.g., Saks v. Saks, 189 Misc. 667, 668, 71 N.Y.S.2d 797, 798 (Faro.
Ct 1947).
114 Supra note 112.
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is the area of inheritance." "' The presence of numerous illegitimates
in society appears to warrant legislative reform. Indeed, it was
estimated that in 1958, there were 200,000 illegitimate births in
the United States.'" A majority of jurisdictions, recognizing the
gravity of the situation, have enacted statutory amendments to
provide increased inheritance rights for the illegitimate.117 In this
respect, there remains only one state which denies an illegitimate
the right to inherit equally from his mother in the same manner
as legitimate issue."" Indeed, two states have already gone so far
as to abolish, for purposes of inheritance, all distinctions between
legitimate and illegitimate children.19
Recognizing the inequity 120 of the present statute which allows
the mother's collaterals to reach the illegitimate's property, without
reciprocative provisions, the legislature has substantially amended
it.
Effective March 1, 1966, inheritance by and from illegitimates
will be governed by Section 83-a of the Decedent Estate Law. The
changes embodied therein are three in number. First, the illegitimate
child is to be considered the legitimate child of the mother, so
that both he and his issue will inherit from his mother and her
kindred. Secondly, where a court of competent jurisdiction makes
an order of filiation prior to, or within two years of the illegitimate's
birth and during the lifetime of the father, such child shall be
considered legitimate for the purpose of intestate distribution of the
father's estate. This declaration of paternity provides the basis for
the illegitimates subsequent inheritance rights in the father's estate;
moreover, the illegitimate's issue shall be entitled to inherit as if he
were legitimate. The legislature, however, has apparently denied
the illegitimate and his issue the right to inherit from his father's
kindred.12' The reasoning here employed is that the parents of the
illegitimate's father will often be unaware of the existence of the
child. 2 2 As a result, they are deprived of an opportunity to dis-
inherit the child by positive action, i.e., by making a will. Thirdly,
where the illegitimate dies intestate, his father will be permitted to
inherit from the child, only if a reciprocal right with respect to his
11Note, 23 BROOKLYN L. REV. 80, 86 (1956).
116 6 PowEu., RE.AL PRoPERTY § 1003 (1958).
117 4 EsTATs REPORT 271.
18 Ibid.
11 In Arizona, "every child is the legitimate child of its natural parents."
6 ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN. ch. 2, § 14-206(A) (1956). See also 1 ORa. REv.
STAT. §109.060 (1953).
120 "None may gainsay the harshness and seeming unfairness of the dis-
crimination against those unfortunate enough to have been born out of wed-
lock, but as the inheritance of property is governed by statute the remedy
must be obtained by the Legislature." Matter of Cady, supra note 110, at 130,
12 N.Y.S.2d at 752.
1214 EsTATEs REPORT 266.
122 Ibid.
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father's estate has previously been established. In other words,
the filiation proceeding, as outlined above, must have been suc-
cessfully completed.
Section 83-a substantially increases the illegitimate's right of
inheritance. In this regard, the legislature's acts are entirely con-
sistent with the recent legislative policy that has been employed by
other states. The enactment of this statute is one more measure
taken to close the vast gap that exists between the illegitimate and
his legitimate brethren.
Renunciation of Intestate Share
In New York it has long been established by case law that one
who is entitled to a testate share of an estate can renounce his
interest completely. The Court of Appeals in Albany Hosp. v.
Guardian Soc'yB 3held that, even though a devise to a named person
is provided for in a will, a devisee may still refuse the gift after
the death of the testator, and title will be held to have never
vested in him, since acceptance or rejection of the attempted testa-
mentary transfer relates back to the time of the devise.' 2 4  Then
the devise (or legacy) will be disposed of as though the designated
devisee (or legatee) predeceased the testator. 2  Although accept-
ance is presumed, the theory is that the devise is like a consensual
transfer, in which property can be offered to, but not forced upon,
the devisee.uB In addition, to constitute an acceptance no formal
assent is necessary,1 27 nor is there any formal procedure for re-
nunciation; any unequivocal declaration of intention to renounce
would appear to be sufficient.2 8
However, the distributee of an intestate share cannot prevent
title from vesting in him. The theory here is that upon the
intestate's death, the distributee, by action of law instantaneously
acquires the right to a beneficial interest in the estate, 129 although he
may subsequently divest himself of the intestate share. 3 The
distributee's share will be diminished by the payment of an in-
heritance tax on the transfer as will the share of a devisee or legatee.
Because the intestate share is said to vest in him immediately,
123214 N.Y. 435, 441, 108 N.E. 812, 813 (1915).
124 Id. at 439-43, 108 N.E. at 813-14. But see Matter of Wilson, 298 N.Y.
398, 403, 83 N.E.2d 852, 854 (1949) (holding that some interest exists in the
devisee before renunciation).225 Matter of Waring, 293 N.Y. 186, 56 N.E2d 543 (1944).
128 Albany Hosp. v. Albany Guardian Soc'y, 214 N.Y. 435, 441, 108 N.E.
812, 814 (1915); Burritt v. Silliman, 13 N.Y. 93, 97 (1855).127 Matter of Wilson, mtpra note 124, at 402-04, 83 N.E2d at 854.
128 Albany Hosp. v. Albany Guardian Soc'y, supra note 126, at 444, 108
N.E. at 814-15. See Oliver v. Wells, 254 N.Y. 451, 459-60, 173 N.E. 676, 679(1930).
129 Matter of Ramsdill, 190 N.Y. 492, 495, 83 N.E. 584, 585 (1908).
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the distributee labors under several disadvantages from which the
devisee (or legatee) is free.
The distributee cannot return the share to the estate to avoid
its attachment by his creditors. 131 However, a devisee (or legatee),
because his renunciation relates back to the time of the testator's
death, can effectively renounce his share, and thereby avoid the
vesting of title. On the other hand, any attempt by the distributee
to renounce his share will be regarded as an independent transfer
of a vested interest. 32 As such, not only will the intestate share
be subject to inheritance taxes,' 33 payable by the estate, but also,
upon transfer back to the estate, it will be subject to gift taxes,' 3'
payable by the distributee. In addition, an attempted transfer back
to the estate may be avoided as an endeavor to defeat the rights
of the distributee's creditors. 3 5  Also, a distributee's attempt to
renounce his intestate share and to testify to the decedent's actions,
which would have the effect of benefiting the witness's successors
in interest, will be disallowed under the "deadman's statute." 136
The Commission on Estates recommended that the disparity
between the right to renounce shares in testacy and intestacy be
removed. It regarded the discrepancy as deriving from theoretical
differences (as distinguished from practical differences) between
taldng under a will and by operation of the law of intestate dis-
tributionY.3 7  The legislature responded by enacting Decedent Estate
Law Section 87-a. Under this section a person entitled to an
intestate share may renounce all or part of it by a signed writing
filed with the surrogate's court within six months 13 after the
issuance of letters of administration. 39 Notice of such renunciation
must also be filed with the representative of the estate and the
other distributees. Furthermore, this right of renunciation will have
the same effect as though the renouncing person had predeceased
the decedent, and shall be retroactive to the date of the decedents
death. 40 Partial renunciations are permitted, but only as to a
percentage of the total share; partial renunciation limited to specified
'131 New York Trust Co. v. Halkin, 68 N.Y.S.2d 404, 406-07 (Sup. Ct 1936).
132 See 6 PAGE, WILLS 38 (1962).
133 Supra note 129.
'34 William L. Maxwell, 17 T.C. 1589 (1952).
135 Supra note 131, at 407.
136 Matter of Aievoli, 272 App. Div. 544, 546-47, 74 N.Y.S.2d 29, 31-32 (2d
Dep't 1947). See CPLR 4519. However, a devisee (or legatee) may renounce
and testify in favor of the will. Loder v. Whelply, 111 N.Y. 239, 18 N.E.
874 (1888).
137 3 ESTATES REPORT 25.
138 This period may be extended in the surrogate's discretion if reasonable
cause is shown.
139 Provision is made for a similar filing on behalf of an infant, incompe-
tent or deceased person. N.Y. Dzcan. EST. LAw § 87-a(2) (supp. 1965).
140 N.Y. DEcE. EST. LAw § 87-a(3) (supp. 1965).
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items is expressly forbidden.14 ' A renunciation may not be made
after the distributee has accepted all or part of the property of the
decedent.142  Finally, one may withdraw or revoke a renunciation
under section 87-a only after application to the proper surrogate's
court which, in the exercise of its discretion, will determine whether
there is reasonable cause for such withdrawal, and only in such
manner as the surrogate directs. 4 3
In creating a right to renounce an intestate share, the legislature
has properly developed rather strict statutory standards and forms.
Its purpose was to avoid any ambiguity with respect to standards
previously established by case law concerning the question of
renunciation of a testate share. Indeed, the length of time during
which a renunciation may be made, and the manner in which it may
be made, in the case of a testate share, are only nebulously defined.
Consistency would appear to mandate that similar rules of renuncia-
tion, in both testate and intestate situations, are desirable. The
statutory standard is easily complied with, and provides adequate
notice to everyone interested in the proceedings. The legislature
could have better equalized the positions of the distributee and the
devisee (or legatee) by determining that the unambiguous standards
of the statute are applicable to both.
The statutory provision dealing with renunciation of an intestate
share in New York is more highly developed than is the case law
concerning renunciation of a testate share. Therefore, the question
arises as to what extent the declared legislative policy with respect
to renunciation of an intestate share will affect those questions still
'undecided in the area of testate renunciation. For example, may
one renounce only part of a testate share, and under what cir-
cumstances may a renunciation be revoked? The courts could
interpret the statute as being applicable to testate as well as intestate
situations, or they could hold that, by omitting reference to the
former situation, the legislature has tacitly approved the existing
body of case law governing testate succession. Whatever the out-
come, the legislature should have made explicit its attitude regarding
the case law concerning renunciation under a will.
The equalization of the positions of those taking a share of an
estate under a will and those taking one by intestacy is a much
needed reform, in view of the fact that there appears to be no
distinction between the passage of property by will or intestacy,
beyond the technical distinctions drawn from their individual legal
theories. It would appear that the legislature has not given full




,N.Y. DEmc. EsT. LAW § 87-a(4) (supp. 1965).
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42 N.Y. DEcm. EsT. LAw § 87-a(5) (supp. 1965).
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